Wto and Other International Agreements Related to Biosafety

Although the complaint against the EU and its wider impact on global biosafety regulations have not yet fully materialised, it is instructive to examine in more detail how the WTO and its relevant agreements affect biosafety and the Cartagena Protocol. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the WTO Agreements Please list all costs and subsidies of organizations whose interests could be harmed by the publication of the response at any time during the previous 36 months, employment, advice, co-ownership or close relationship with an organization whose interests could be harmed by the publication of the response. Please also list any non-financial associations or interests (personal, professional, political, institutional, religious or other) that a reasonable reader would like to know in relation to the submitted work. This applies to all authors of the play, their spouses or partners. 133 Marceau, loc. cit., Note 122, 127 n.131 (citing, inter alia, Jenks, C. Wilfred The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 1953 Brit. Y.B. Int`l L. 401) Google Scholar; Pauwelyn, loc.

cit. 70, p. 550 (“International law recognizes a presumption against conflict”). While the TBT Convention recognizes the right of countries to adopt the standards they deem appropriate, it aims to ensure that regulations, standards, tests and certification procedures (which vary from country to country) do not create unnecessary barriers. WTO Members will not be prevented from taking the necessary measures to ensure compliance with their standards. To avoid too much diversity, the agreement encourages countries to apply international standards where appropriate, but does not require them to change their level of protection accordingly. WTO Members are encouraged to use international standards, guidelines and recommendations wherever they exist, although they may apply measures leading to higher standards if there is a scientific justification. They may also set higher standards based on an appropriate risk assessment, provided that the approach is not arbitrary. Nothing in this Protocol shall affect the sovereignty of States over their territorial sea, established in accordance with international law, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction enjoyed by States in their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in accordance with international law, and the exercise by ships of maritime rights and freedoms provided for in international law and enshrined in relevant international agreements. Aircraft.

“In cases where the relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available relevant information, including information from competent international organizations and sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall endeavour to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective risk assessment and to review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time. 138 See footnote 135 above. Marceau, loc. cit. 122, paragraph 127 No 131, notes that the possibility of a conflict between a WTO provision and a provision of another treaty is reflected in the wto Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Concerning Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Clothing and Other Articles, WT/DS56/AB/R & Corr. 1, DSR1998: III, 1033 (adopted on 22 April 1998), which concluded that there was an “inconsistent” conflict between the Argentine DSU with the International Monetary Fund and Article VII of the GATT 1994. The protocol also states that trade and multilateral environmental agreements should support each other. The concessions mean that the “special rule of law” is not applicable in this case, nor is the rule that a more recent law prevails. Therefore, the relationship between the Protocol and other international agreements is not really addressed.

The question is therefore open as to the extent to which the WTO will take account of the Cartagena Protocol. 69 Article 30(2) of the Vienna Convention, loc. cit. 66, provides that `[w]here a contract determines that it is the subject of an earlier or subsequent treaty or that it is not to be regarded as incompatible with that treaty, the provisions of that other treaty shall prevail`. 140 See Charnovitz, loc. cit., footnote 49; see also Philip, M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 Va.J.Int`l L. 379 464–65 (1996)Google Scholar (noted that “[i]n the event that the World Trade Organization decides, for example, that the Agreement on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora or any other equally popular agreement violates the provisions of trade agreements, acceptance by the World Trade Organization would likely diminish” (citations omitted)). The relationship between the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the WTO Agreements has not yet been clarified. The following article examines the impact of the WTO Biosafety Agreements and the Cartagena Protocol. 82 Such discrimination could involve several WTO provisions. As noted above, Article 2.3 of the SPS Convention prohibits measures that discriminate “arbitrarily or unjustifiably” between countries “where the same or similar conditions prevail”.

Kind. 5.5 of this Agreement states that governments “shall avoid arbitrary or unjustified distinctions” as to the level of protection they deem appropriate in different situations “where such differences lead to discrimination or disguised restriction of international trade”. Article 2(1) of the TBT Agreement also prohibits discrimination between imports or between imports and domestic like products. For comparable provisions of GATT, Articles III and XX, see footnote 37 above. The differences between the WTO Agreements and the Protocol on the Precautionary Principle are more formal. If a WTO Member bans a GMO because it suspects a risk, it must constantly review that decision. However, the Cartagena Protocol does not require such an automatic review, but obliges its Contracting States to review their decision in the light of new data at the request of the applicant. 120 Thus.B International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, adopted on 3 November 2001 and available from , contains a savings clause in its preamble. This clause reads as follows: “Reaffirming that nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as implying in any way a modification of the rights and obligations of the Parties under other international agreements” (emphasis added). Trade-related measures related to biosafety are covered by three WTO Agreements – the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. A key trade principle that applies to the WTO is that of non-discrimination. For example, Members should not apply any measure that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries.

Therefore, biosafety legislation containing trade-related measures should not distinguish between different Member States, i.e. an importing country concerned about GMO imports cannot, for example, ban products from the US but allow the import of the same products, for example from the EU. The SPS Agreement allows countries to set their own standards as long as the rules are based on scientific evidence, are applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where the same or similar conditions prevail. WTO Members are encouraged to use international standards, guidelines and recommendations wherever they exist, although they may apply measures leading to higher standards if there is a scientific justification. They may also set higher standards based on an appropriate risk assessment, provided that the approach is not arbitrary. A dispute (such as the complaint against the EU) arises when a country takes a trade policy measure or takes measures that one or more WTO Members consider to be contrary to the WTO Agreements or do not comply with their obligations. 86 See e.B. Zhangliang, Chen, Unlimited Prospects for Biotechnology, Knowledge Econ. [Zhishi Jingji], December 1999, at 22-28 Google Scholar, abstract translated into U.S. Embassy Beijing, PRC Biotech: Top Researcher Sees Great Prospects (Jan. 2000), at the (the author, vice-chancellor of Peking University and one of China`s foremost biotechnology researchers and policy advisers, expresses boundless optimism for the future of Chinese biotechnology, noting, among other things, how possible bans on genetically modified organisms for religious reasons and the Four-Year shutdown of these organisms by the European Union “have a serious impact on the United States. .

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